The fate of Iran’s nuclear programme has re-emerged as one of the most intractable elements of the ceasefire negotiations, with the United States demanding its dismantlement as a core condition of any deal and Iran treating such a demand as an unacceptable infringement of its sovereignty. The nuclear issue, which has defined US-Iran relations for decades, has now become a live military flashpoint at the centre of an active war.
The American ceasefire proposal delivered through Pakistan reportedly included demands for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure — going far beyond the limitations imposed by the 2015 nuclear agreement. From Washington’s perspective, the war has created a unique opportunity to resolve the nuclear question definitively rather than through the incremental and reversible compromises of previous diplomacy. The logic is that military pressure has created the leverage needed to achieve a permanent outcome.
Iran’s rejection of this demand is categorical. Tehran views its nuclear programme as both a sovereign right and a strategic deterrent — the ultimate insurance policy against regime change. Having watched what happened to Libya and Iraq after they gave up weapons programmes, Iran’s leadership has consistently concluded that nuclear capability is the only reliable guarantee of survival. No diplomatic formula that removes that capability entirely is acceptable to Tehran, regardless of what other concessions accompany it.
The US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-day war last summer set back the programme significantly, but Iranian engineers have shown considerable resilience in rebuilding and relocating critical capabilities. The extent of the current damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is disputed, with different assessments from intelligence agencies and international monitors. What is not disputed is that Iran retains the knowledge, the personnel, and the intention to reconstitute its capabilities once the military pressure eases.
Any durable peace deal will likely need to find a middle ground on the nuclear issue — one that gives the US credible assurances against weaponisation without demanding the complete dismantlement that Iran will never accept. Previous frameworks, including the 2015 deal, showed that such middle ground is possible in principle. Whether the post-war political environment, with its accumulated distrust and military trauma, allows for the kind of sustained diplomatic engagement that such a formula requires is another question entirely.